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Abstract
Prior literature suggests that media reports acting as external supervision improve
information transparency and corporate governance leading to increased investment 
efficiency. This study empirically tests this hypothesis in the context of online social 
networks by investigating the combined effects of online social networking and media reports
on investment efficiency using a sample of Chinese listed firms. Our results show that the 
interaction of media reports and Tobin’s q ratio is negatively related to corporate investment 
efficiency. However, the introduction of online social networks turns this relationship from a
negative to a positive and statistically significant one. The combined factors significantly
increase investment efficiency in non-SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) but not in SOEs. We 
provide evidence that online social networking effectively mitigates the negative effect of
media supervision on investment efficiency, further advancing knowledge of the link of 
external supervision and corporate governance.
Keywords: Online social networks; media supervision; investment efficiency; China; Sina
Weibo





       
      
     
     
     
         
    
       
     
     
    
   
      
   
     
   
      
       
   
        
     
1. Introduction
Prior studies in corporate governance suggest that the efficiency of corporate investment
is mainly affected by information asymmetry and agency problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Armstrong et al., 2011). Agency problems arise due to conflicts of interest between managers 
and shareholders as managers’ investment behavior is often motivated by maximizing
self-benefit rather than that of shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Cao et al., 2018). Under the
presence of information asymmetry between corporate insiders and the capital market,
investors have to compete over the acquisition of valuable information regarding firms’ 
current performance and future potential, and the costs of such an activity are typically
passed to the cost of equity capital; hence, introduce some degree of inefficiency in corporate
investment (Armstrong et al., 2011; Akins et al., 2012; Lai et al., 2014). 
Extant literature has investigated various factors explaining firms’ investment efficiency.
Empirical studies suggest that financial reporting quality explains the investment efficiency
of both private firms (Chen et al., 2011a) and listed companies (Gomariz et al., 2014). Study
of Chen et al. (2011b) supports the proposition that government intervention is significantly
associated with investment efficiency and that there is a difference in the effect between 
state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. Jin and Yu (2018) find that executive networks
and government governance can improve investment efficiency. Another strand of the
literature investigates the role that information disclosure plays in investment efficiency
(Dutta and Nezlobin, 2017; Cheng et al., 2013). Studies suggest that firms with increased 
levels of disclosure reduce information asymmetry; restrain agency problems, and thus




     
      
       
  
    
   
   
  
     
     
       
 
       
     
  
 
    
    
      
    
      
Zavyalova et al., 2012; Bednar, 2012; Chen et al., 2014). Consistent with the effect of
disclosure on investment efficiency, a growing literature pays attention to the effect of media
reports, termed media supervision, as media reports play a supervisory role in exposing 
business scandals (Zhang and Su, 2015). Zhang and Su (2015) suggest that media supervision, 
via an external corporate governance mechanism, can inhibit the level of corporate
overinvestment to enhance the efficiency of corporate investment.
With the development of internet technology, online social networks (or ‘social media’)
such as Weibo, WeChat, Twitter, Facebook, provide significant advantages regarding the 
efficient disclosure of information to the wider public in terms of both cost and convenience
(Babutsidze, 2018). Blankespoor et al. (2014) show that if companies disclose information 
simultaneously in traditional media (or ‘media’) channels such as TV and newspaper and on 
Twitter, it reduces the stock price difference significantly; alleviating information asymmetry
and improving stock liquidity. In addition to the dissemination of important information, 
online social media sites play an increasingly critical role in socialisation and networking, 
which is different from the functions of the traditional media (Neti et al., 2011; Kizgin et al.,
2018; Munzel et al., 2018). Can corporations make the best out of this unique function of 
online social networking, in particular for the enhancement of investment efficiency? There is 
no documented research addressing this question. Thus, this study aims to fill in the research 
gap. In detail, we seek to understand the effects of combined online social networking and
media supervision of traditional media (hereafter, media supervision) on investment
efficiency; as well as to understand the impact of big data analysis and technological 




      
    
   
 
     
       
     
     
     
     
   
   
        
       
     
       
   
                                                             
           
            
       
       
 
            
        
             
          
 
development within business. To do so, we use a sample of Chinese listed companies for the
period 2011 to 2016 and analyze their financial data, the mainstream financial media reports,
and the corporate Sina Weibo data.
In China, Sina Weibo, Tencent Weibo, WeChat, QQ, and Momo constitute the main 
platforms in online social networking. In particular, Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo are the
main platforms for corporates to release public information, playing an increasingly
important role in alleviating information asymmetry, and improving governance efficiency.
For instance, the headlines of the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Associated
Press reported a suspected scandal of the CEO of JD.com in the United States on the 2nd of 
September 2018. JD.com posted on its official Weibo account later on the same day, quoting
‘…Mr. Liu Qiangdong has experienced false accusation during his business trip in the United
States, and the police have found no misconduct in the follow-up investigation’. JD.com’s 
official Weibo further responded to public concerns on the 3rd of September 2018. 1 The
above two posts received significant attention. By the 6th of October 2018, the two statements
were directly forwarded 24,000 times and 39,000 times respectively; while, the number of
public comments in support of the JD.com’s CEO was 3,266 and the number of thumbs up, 
an indication of satisfaction, was 30,000 and 124,000 respectively.2,3 On September the 4th, 
1The statement on JD.COM’s official Weibo account reads, ‘Mr. Liu Qiangdong has been wronged of untrue 
accusation during his business trip in the United States, and the police have found no misconduct in the 
follow-up investigation. He will continue his trip as planned. We will take the necessary legal action against 
false reports or rumors’. Source from JD.COM’s official Weibo account:
https://m.microblog.cn/p/1005052839378595.
2The ‘0’ reply to the statement on the official Weibo account on September 3 is a profound demonstration of the 
Weibo followers’ ‘wordless’ support for Mr. Liu Qiangdong, the CEO of JD.COM.
3The number of retweets, replies and thumb up does not include the number of screenshots and link retweets





        
          
         
       
    
    
    
     
   
   
       
   
       
    
       




      
      
                                                             
   
Citigroup placed JD.com in the list of ‘Negative Catalyst Watch’,4 causing its share price to 
fall sharply on that day, but without any impact on its business and sales in the Chinese
region. This is because JD.com had successfully used online social networks as a means to
reduce the negative impact of the traditional media reports and effectively alleviate the
problem of information asymmetry that could have caused panic to its investors. The example
from JD.com is not unusual in China in the digital era. Such digital environments provide a 
range of evidence which forms the basis for this study.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. Firstly, we advance knowledge on the effect
of media supervision on investment efficiency with the empirical analysis of the latest data
available. Secondly, by assessing the effect of online social networks when combined with 
media supervision on investment efficiency, we enhance understanding of the effect of media
supervision on investment efficiency in the light of the social media context.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and
presents our testable hypotheses; Section 3 articulates our sampling procedure, data, and 
econometric methodology; Section 4 reports our findings. This is followed by a discussion of
the findings in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and development of hypotheses
2.1. Media supervision and investment efficiency
Many studies indicate that the better corporate governance is, the higher the investment 
efficiency will be (Richardson et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2011b). Media reports revealing the




     
 
      
     
       
   
   
   
    
       
    
       
   
     
       
   
    
     
    
      
     
     
hidden contracts or ‘hidden rules’ of a company act as an important supervisory force (Allen
et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2014). Therefore, via an important external governance mechanism, 
media is conducive to the improvement of corporate governance (Liu and McConnell, 2013;
Yang et al., 2014; Rogers et al., 2016). Prior literature has documented two schools of
thought about the way media can achieve a supervisory effect on corporate governance in
China (Zhang and Su, 2015). One mechanism is through the instigation of government 
involvement; while the other, via the impact on executives’ reputation (Liu and McConnell,
2013). In the first case, government intervention is a critical step to realise the effect of media
supervision over corporate governance, and the repercussions and responses generated by
media reports are the essential conditions in bringing government ‘attention’ and
‘intervention’. By reporting and disseminating corporate information, media reports help to 
reduce possible asymmetry between firms and investors. Hence, media has a significantly
positive effect on corporate investment efficiency (Zhang and Su, 2015; Jonathan et al., 2016).
In the second case, media reports attract corporate executives’ attention, and subsequently,
those executives may feel the pressure to enhance corporate governance within their firms
(Liu and McConnell, 2013). In this latter case, media reports need neither to generate 
repercussions nor to attract the attention of government departments; instead, company
executives feel the need to improve corporate governance for the sake of personal reputation
and to eliminate possible operational risks arising from the increased scrutiny.
The effect of media outlets on corporate governance depends not only on the difference
in the dissemination mechanism but also on the choice of media report tendency, i.e., whether




        
      
   
        
    
  
   
    
      
     
      
     
   
     
   
     
  
      
    
    
        
         
media reports, positive media reports place less pressure on firms’ senior executives. Instead,
it can inspire them and boost their confidence; hence, enhance their investment willingness, 
which produces overinvestment (Deephouse, 2000; Bednar, 2012). This overinvestment
activity reduces overall investment efficiency and produces a negative effect on corporate
governance (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Zhang and Su, 2015). Based on the above
discussion, we expect positive and negative media reports to affect corporate investment 
efficiency in a different direction, and hence we posit the following two hypotheses:
H1: Media reports have a positive effect on corporate investment efficiency;
H2a: Positive media reports when combined with investment opportunities are negatively
related to corporate investment efficiency;
H2b: Negative media reports when combined with investment opportunities are positively
related to corporate investment efficiency.
Furthermore, for enterprises of different ownership types, e.g., state-owned (SOEs) or
non-state owned (non-SOEs), the effect of media reports varies. China has a large number of
non-SOEs, which are significantly different from SOEs in terms of financing, investment 
opportunities, corporate governance mechanism and media preference (Chen et al., 2011b; 
Jonathan et al., 2016). Prior research on the impact of media supervision on investment 
efficiency has produced mixed results. Zhu and Tan (2014) revealed that media supervision
alleviates inefficient investment in both SOEs and non-SOEs, but is more binding for
non-SOEs. However, He et al. (2008) found that the executive reputation mechanism caused 
by media supervision has a very limited effect on the governance of executives’ behaviour in




       
   
    
      
      
     





        
       
      
     
      
       
         
  
        
        
   
                                                             
                
undergoing significant market reform. SOEs still account for a large proportion of the 
national ownership structure. Instead of using a transparent procedure, which allows the 
board of directors to select agents independently, using an open and fair competition among
candidates, SOEs apply a top-down appointment system to recruit their management agents.
Within this unique context, media supervision of SOEs’ corporate governance is realised by
capturing the attention of relevant administrative agencies rather than the reputation of their
executives (Lai et al., 2014). We therefore expect that the above effects will vary between
SOEs and non-SOEs. 
2.2. Online social networks, media supervision and investment efficiency
‘Online social networks’ refer to individuals’ socialising and networking activities via 
the use of internet-based social media sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. Most 
sites allow users to share interest and exchange messages in their special interest group
(Fotiadis and Stylos, 2017). The messages between users are publically accessible and can be
captured by using web crawling or spidering software (Mislove et al., 2007; Chang, 2018).
The online social networking sites have the advantage of ‘real-time interaction’ that 
traditional media lack. Active and instant exchange of ideas and messages between investors
and managers enhance information disclosure, alleviating the problem of information
asymmetry and improving the efficiency of governance (Blankespoor et al., 2014). As a
platform for releasing corporate information, a firm’s online social network gathers all kinds
of supporters, 5 termed fans, who are interested in the corporate’s business philosophy, 




   
   
      
    
       
 
        
      
  
         
    
        
     
    
          
     
       
       
       
        
         
    
innovation, research and development, organisational culture, product services, and
information disclosure. Consequently, the interaction and engagement of the fans form an
interconnected online social networking community on the corporate social media account.
Within the corporate online social media account, all stakeholders such as the government,
investors, and customers, share investment information and communicate their thoughts and
concerns.
Recent literature is increasingly investigating the influence of online social networks on
the performance of the various aspects of a business, i.e., marketing, human resource
management, and education (Wahsh et al., 2016; Yasse and Husin, 2017; Pimmer et al., 2016).
However, there is still no study on the effect of online social networking on corporate
governance and investment efficiency. Recently, Rosati et al. (2018) revealed that the 
disclosure of corporate information through online social networks significantly affects the
current stock price. The authors found that online social networks correlate with traditional 
media and that the impact of online social networks on stock price is contingent on traditional 
media visibility, e.g., a positive moderating effect for low-visibility firms. The evidence of
the correlation between the traditional media report and online social media networking can
also be seen in the case of JD.com described in the introductory section. However, unlike
traditional media reporting news and information by media agents, corporate online social
networks typically release ‘favorable’ messages and statements which are in the firm’s
interests. For example, when media portray a firm in a negative way, the firm’s online social
networking platforms are more likely to release information to ‘disclose the truth’, which is a




        
    
         
     
     
     
    
    
  
        
 
      
      
 
   
      
     
  
        
       
   
          
suggest that the use of online social networking can moderate the effect of positive media
reports on corporate investment inefficiency by correcting the effect direction from negative
towards positive. When media reports positive news about a company, the executive is more
likely to engage in over-investment activities (Deephouse, 2000; Bednar, 2012; Malmendier
and Tate, 2008). Meanwhile, on online social networking platforms, investors and other 
online community stakeholders can constantly communicate and engage with the firm’s
executive board. This interaction and communication subsequently alter executive decisions 
and reduce investment inefficiency. Hence, online social networks can alleviate the
principal-agent problem between executives and shareholders (Lai et al., 2014; Liu and
McConnell, 2013) and enhance corporate governance (Lee et al., 2015; Blankespoor et al.,
2018).
From the above discussion, we expect online social networks to eventually improve
corporate governance and investment efficiency. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypotheses:
H3: Online social networks have a significant effect on investment efficiency;
H4a: Online social networks moderate the effect of positive media reports when combined
with investment opportunities on investment inefficiency, by correcting the direction of 
the effect from negative towards positive;
H4b: Online social networks moderate the positive effect of negative media reports when
combined with investment opportunities on investment efficiency, by reducing the size
of the negative effect.




    
     
       
      
          
      
  
    
        
      
   




   
          
          
    
       
     
        
hypotheses under discussion (Figure 1). Following previous research in media supervision 
and corporate investment efficiency (e.g., Chen et al., 2014; Rogers et al., 2016), we expect
that traditional media supervision improves investment efficiency (H1). We argue in this
research that positive and negative media reports affect corporate investment efficiency
differently and therefore, we examine their effects on investment efficiency separately (H2a 
and H2b). Meanwhile, online social networks have been widely applied to strategy
development and business practices (Pappas et al., 2018). However, little documented
research has investigated the effect of online social networks on corporate investment
efficiency and hence we will fill in the gap in this research (H3). Further, the JD story
described in the introduction section demonstrates an example of how corporates use online
social networks to interact with traditional media. This justifies our interest in how online
social networks moderate the effects of traditional media of both positive and negative media
supervision on investment efficiency (H4a and H4b). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample selection and data
Our sample of listed A-shares is obtained from the CSMAR database, and it covers the
period 2011 to 2016. Our screening and sampling criteria are as follows. We first eliminate all
companies that had been delisted or entered the Chinese market in the period after 2016. We
also excluded all firms in the financial and insurance sectors since those two sectors use
different accounting principles. We also eliminated all those firms with incomplete/missing




        
    
          
     
        
      
       
 
          
        
   
    
       
       
     
      
     
   
           
    
         
         
firms. To carry out panel data regression, we considered only those media reports, e.g., 
reports of Merger & Acquisition, which may have an impact on the investment behaviour of
those firms. As a result, we developed a sample of 1404 media observations. To study the
difference in the effects between firms with media reports and a control sample comprised of
firms without media reports, we used a firm-matching methodology. Each firm with records
of media reports was paired with one non-media counterpart based on company size. From
the original 5,646 records, we obtained a sample of 2,808 records (1404 paired-matched
firms).
Our media reports’ data were collected from the CNKI database. In line with Fang et al.
(2014), we selected seven mainstream financial media from the database, namely The China
Securities Journal, Shanghai Securities News, Securities Times, Securities Daily, The
Economic Observer, 21st Century Business Herald, and China Business Journal. After data
cleaning, 7581 records remained. Furthermore, we followed a strict screening procedure to 
ensure that only reports relevant to corporate investment were selected. We classified
non-derogatory wording reports concerning future investment expectations and positive
evaluations as positive reports and classified non-complimentary wording reports concerning 
worries and negative evaluations as negative ones. This resulted in a sample of 429 media
reports related to 234 listed companies, of which 312 reports were reported as positive and 
117 as negative. The category of investment-related media reports is based on the lists of
Xinhua Dictionary terms, and Baidu terms about common investment in China’s capital
market; the categories of positive and negative reports-related media reports are based on the




   
       
       
   
     
       
        
     
       
  
    
   
      
     
      
       
         
    
      
     
                                                             
          
           
            
  
market (Appendix A).
Finally, we also used data from online social networks. WeChat, QQ, Sina Weibo, and
Tencent Weibo are the most popular social network platforms in China. Among them, Sina
Weibo and Tencent Weibo are the ones most popularly used by Chinese corporates as a means
of releasing information and communicating with their stakeholders and the wider public. 
Therefore, we collected the data for this study from Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo. When
examining the Corporate Tencent Weibo data, we noticed that there is very limited evidence
of engagement and interaction in terms of users’ ‘repost’ and ‘reply’ records. Therefore, we
selected only data from the Corporate Sina Weibo platform as a proxy of online social
network activity.
The Weibo data mainly consists of (i) the status of the company’s official account on 
Sina Weibo (Yes or No), (ii) number of followings, (iii) number of followers (or Weibo fans), 
(iv) number of posts (original), and (v) number of forwards of those posts. The variation of
these numbers reflects the extent of corporate online social networking capabilities and
efforts made by the firms. We first piloted the data collection by adopting a Python crawler 
approach, in line with Sanner (1999). This involved collecting and verifying the blog data of 
Dehua TB New Decoration Material Co., Ltd, a listed company in China. We collected 3,295
posts from the company’s official account on Sina Weibo covering the entire period from
2011 to 2016. We then proceeded using a manual screening process to confirm the validity of
the pilot data and to verify their accuracy. To overcome certain issues with data extraction,6 
6 During this stage we noticed that the biggest difficulty using the automated data collection method is that the 
Python algorithm can be flagged by the Sina Weibo network as abnormal access because it repeatedly enters the 
company’s official account to collect data. This affected considerably the speed and inevitably our progress on




      
    
    
    
     
     
     
   
       
   
       
    
 
    
   




       
     
                                                             
         
we organised a data collection team of 15 research assistants which managed to identify a
total of 692,515 posts related to 234 companies, including 28,222 posts relevant to corporate
investment and 664,293 posts otherwise.7 
To identify investment-relevant posts, we screen the collected data according to the
following rules: Firstly, we select the official account of the listed company or the CEO’s 
account or the account with the largest number of fans. The reason for such a rule is that
when companies choose to release official information on Weibo, they often post it through
the account with the largest number of fans. Besides, the account with the largest number of
fans is very likely to have multiple re-posts of relevant information. Thus, we select the
account with the largest number of fans to also remove possible duplication issues; secondly, 
we screen multiple posts with exactly the same content and selected the one with the most
‘forwards’ while eliminating the others; thirdly, posts relevant to corporate social
responsibility (social welfare, etc.), important information disclosure, inspection of important 
leaders, major scientific and technological breakthrough plans, major project cooperation,
company development planning, major personnel appointments, and financial data release
topics are treated as investment-relevant posts. This results in a total number of 1,404
observations to be used for our analysis.
3.2. Variables and measures
We classify media reports into three categories, namely (i) the total number of reports,
(ii) the number of positive reports, and, (iii) the number of negative reports. Our




     
         
      
        
     
  
       
     
          
      
       
    
        
        
      
         
   
 
  
       
     
     
measurement is different from that of Zhang and Su’s (2015), where media governance is 
classified as ‘high’ or ‘low’ level using The Chinese Media Development Index Report by
Guoming Yu. In terms of online social networks, we investigate the Sina Weibo, which has a
wide and significant influence in China. Data on online social networks is collected from
corporate Sina Weibo accounts, including the number of followings, number of followers (or
fans in Chinese), number of posts, and number of ‘forwards’.
We adopt a similar methodology to Chen et al. (2011b) and use investment expenditure
as our dependent variable acting as a proxy for investment efficiency. Media reports and
online social networks are our two main explanatory variables. In line with Yang and Zhao
(2016), we define the total media reports (Tmedia) as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of media reports. Using a similar approach, we also decompose the total media
reports into positive and negative ones with Pmedia and Nmedia estimated as the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the number of positive (negative) news’ reports. Following Chen et al.
(2011b), we also use cash flow (Cfo), financial leverage (Lev), investment opportunity (Tq),
company Size (Size), equity financing (Seo) and listing year (List) as control variables. The
model variables are all treated with a lag phase to reduce possible endogeneity. The
definitions of the variables are presented in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
3.3. Model development
Online social networking or social media communities have been studied in broad terms
using various approaches when combined with a specific research domain. For instance, in




    
   
       
       
   
    
 
     
      
    
      
      
 
        
        
      
     
          
    
     
 
                                                             
           
al., 2018); in analyzing user sentiments and associated emotion, experiment data and fuzzy
modeling are used (Karyotis et al., 2018). In our research domain, i.e., corporate finance, 
according to Modigliani and Milller (1958), the firm’s investment policy is solely dependent 
on its investment opportunities as measured by Tobin’s Q (1969). Chen et al. (2011b)
introduced government intervention into the model in order to examine the effect of political 
connection on the investment inefficiency in Chinese SOEs. We revise the
investment-efficiency model developed by Chen et al. (2011b) and formulate our econometric
models, Model 1 and Model 2. In Model 1, we add media reports to that of Chen et al. 
(2011b), investigating the impact of media reports on corporate investment efficiency, which
is a further development to the model of Zhang and Su (2015). Zhang and Su (2015) 
examined the effect of media governance on corporate overinvestment behavior, while Model
1 distinguishes the difference of the impact of positive and negative media reports on
corporates’ investment efficiency.
Further, in Model 2 we add the variable of online social networks to Model 1, assessing
its effect on corporate governance. In line with most prior literature on investment efficiency
(Lai et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2011b), our endogenous variable in the measure has a one year 
lag to that of the explanatory variables. This approach is different from the one used in Chen
et al. (2011b) as unlike their study we attempt to measure the impact of changes in media
reports to corporates’ investment efficiency. 8 These models are algebraically illustrated as:
 , 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 , 1 4 , 1
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
INV a a Tq a Media a Tq Media a CFO
a Lev a SEO a Size a Listage 
    
   
     









   
   
           
       
     
   
         
       
             
        
       




        
      
    
     




, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 , 1
5 , 1 , 1 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1
9 , 1 10 , 1 ,
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i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
INV a a Tq a Media a Sn a Tq Media
a Tq Media Sn a CFO a Lev a SEO
a Size a Listage 
    
     
 
     
     
  
(2)
where all variables are explained in Table 1. 
In our empirical tests, we firstly use Model 1 to examine H1, H2a, and H2b, which
focuses on the interaction effect of Media reports and investment opportunities (Tq) on 
investment efficiency. If the regression coefficient is positive, it indicates that media reports
when combined with investment opportunities improve investment efficiency; otherwise,
they reduce it. We then use Model 2 to examine H3, H4a, and H4b, which focuses on the
interaction effect of Media reports, Tq, and Online social networks (Sn) on investment 
efficiency. We expect the interaction effect of Media reports, Tq and Sn to be opposite to that
of Media reports and Tq, indicating that online social networks have a positive moderating
effect on media governance over investment efficiency. In both models, Media will be
replaced by Tmedia, Pmedia, and Nmedia, respectively.
4. Results and analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics and analysis
The descriptive statistics of sample variables are presented in Table 2. The average value
for online social networking is 0.335; while for media reports, positive reports and negative
reports are 0.131, 0.104, and 0.033, respectively. With the same method of statistical
approach, the descriptive characteristics of other variables in this research are close to those
of previous studies (e.g., Zhang and Su, 2015).




     
       
     
     
      
 
     




     
       
    
         
     
     
         
  
      
     
     
     
Table 3 presents the descriptive analysis of paired and media samples. From this table, 
we can see that the mean values of investment expenditure for both types of samples are
similar (i.e., 0.046 versus 0.045) with minor differences for the cases of all other variables.
For example, the mean value of the proxy for investment opportunities (Tq) in the case of the 
media samples is 1.815, which is marginally larger than that of the paired samples (1.017).
This is also evident in the case of all other variables with no statistically significant difference
between the values of the paired and media samples (see Table 4). This allows us to 
generalise our test results from the media sample to all samples.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here]
4.2. Regression results
Model 1 is used to test the hypotheses H1, H2a, and H2b, while Model 2 tests H3, H4a, 
and H4b. We chose the maximum likelihood estimation method (ML) in our tests since this
methodological approach offers important advantages for the logistic regression used in this
study such as allowing us to get model estimates without using prior distributions and 
addressing possible problems of endogeneity. The use of such a method is in line with prior
methodological literature, e.g., Villas-Boas and Winer (1999), and Park and Gupta (2008).
Also, the statistical properties of the ML approach have more consistency and less bias when
there are a sufficiently large number of observations (Gelman et al., 2008).
The results of model 1 are presented in Table 5. Column (1) shows the regression results
of the effect of the total number of media reports on firms’ investment efficiency. We find that
investment opportunities (coefficient of 0.008, z-value of 4.685), and total media reports




   
    
      
     
    
     
       
  
      
        
     
      
        
      
    
    
      
        
  
   
          
   
investment efficiency. The interaction of the total number of media reports and investment 
opportunities is negatively and significantly related to the efficiency of investment 
expenditure (coefficient of -0.007, z-value of -1.845). This could be attributed to the fact that
the effect of positive media reports is much stronger than that of the negative ones, further
boosting the confidence of company’s management to promote excessive investment 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Such activities can subsequently lead to a reduction in 
investment efficiency so that the effect of media supervision on corporate governance has
weakened or become dysfunctional.
To further explore the effect of media reports on investment efficiency, we separate all
media reports into positive and negative ones. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 present the
regression results of the effects of positive and negative media reports on investment 
efficiency. Overall, we find a statistically significant relationship between the number of
positive media reports and the aspect of investment efficiency (coefficient of 0.025, z-value of
1.988); however, the interaction of such positive reports with investment opportunities is 
significantly and negatively related to investment efficiency (coefficient of -0.015, z-value of
-2.407). Column (3) of Table 5 shows that the effect of negative media reports on investment 
efficiency is statistically insignificant. Of all the control variables used in this model, the 
results for the cash flow (Cfo), leverage (Lev) and equity financing (Seo) are consistent with 
the findings reported in Chen et al. (2011b). Our results also show that the age of the listed 
firms is negatively related to investment efficiency, indicating that older firms with both 
positive and negative media coverage are more likely to engage in activities that lead to a






      
     
    
  
       
       
   
    
  
        
        
     
  
  
     
      
     
     
        
    
but reject hypothesis H2b. 
[Insert Table 5 about here]
We further examine the possible differences in the effects of media supervision on
investment efficiency between SOEs and non-SOEs of the Chinese listed companies. 
According to Table 6, the effects of the total media reports (coefficients of 0.023, z-values of
2.011) and the positive media reports (coefficients of 0.025, z-values of 1.988) on investment 
efficiency for the SOEs group are both positive and statistically significant. The interaction 
effects of combined total media reports or positive media reports with investment opportunity
are both negative and significant in the SOEs group (coefficients of -0.015, z-value of -2.614;
coefficients of -0.015, z-value of -2.407). These results are consistent with those reported for
the full sample test in Table 5.
The picture from the non-SOEs shows a different story. According to Table 6, the total
media reports, the positive reports, the negative reports, and the interaction of media reports
with investment opportunities (columns 3, 5 and 7) are all insignificantly related to
investment expenditure in non-SOEs. 
[Insert Table 6 about here]
We now proceed with the investigation of the effect of online social networks on 
investment efficiency. We anticipated that online social networks, as a resource or social
capital, should be relatively equally accessible for all companies, including both SOEs and 
non-SOEs. Table 7 reports the results of the link between online social networks and
investment efficiency, with the former being a proxy for corporate governance. According to




    
   
     
      
    
     
      
        
   
  
       
    
       
      
   
   
       
   
      
            
    
         
networks with the total media reports is positive and statistically significant (coefficient of
0.012, z-value of 2.214). In contrast, the interaction effects of combined investment 
opportunities with the total media reports (coefficient of -0.015, z-value of -2.928) or the 
positive reports (coefficient of -0.012, z-value of -2.124) are negative and statistically
significant. Our results suggest that too many positive reports in traditional media promote 
corporates’ excessive investment behaviour that subsequently leads to investment inefficiency. 
Furthermore, the presence of online social networks appears to act as a catalyst for
investment efficiency, as the relevant relationships are changed from negative to positive and
statistically significant (coefficients of 0.012 and 0.015, respectively). 
[Insert Table 7 about here]
The comparative analysis of the online social networking effect upon SOEs versus 
non-SOEs is shown in Table 8. We found in SOEs that the regression coefficients of the 
interaction of media reports and investment opportunities with online social networks are
insignificant (coefficients of 0.007 and 0.011 respectively, z-values of 0.736 and 0.976
respectively), indicating that online social networking of SOEs cannot effectively alleviate the
negative effect of media reports on corporate investment efficiency. 
By contrast, in the case of the non-SOEs, the interaction effect of combining the three
variables (total media reports, investment opportunities and online social networks) on 
investment efficiency, is positive and significantly significant (coefficient of 0.016, z-value of
2.296). This result is also confirmed in the case of positive media reports, and the relevant
coefficient is 0.020 (z-value of 2.309) while the relevant effect is insignificant (coefficient of




        
    
     
  
      
        
     
         
         
            
     
          
     
      
    
    
      
     
         
   
  
     
social networks of non-SOEs significantly reverses the negative effect of media reports,
possibly preventing irrational and excessive corporate investment decision-making. This 
improves corporate governance and investment efficiency. 
[Insert Table 8 about here]
To investigate further the influential mechanism of online social networks on investment
efficiency, we used the number of fans in the corporate Weibo accounts as the indicator of the
intensity of corporate’s online social networking and the media users’ engagement level
(Rosati et al., 2018). We conducted a comparative analysis of two different intensity groups
based on the number of fans, namely, Lgroup (Large group of fans) versus Sgroup (Small
group of fans). To do so, we used the average number of fans (2364.07) in the corporate Sina 
accounts as our cutoff point. All firms with an average number of fans above the statistical 
mean are classified as part of the Lgroup and vice versa (Appendix B). The results of this
comparative analysis are presented in Table 9.
According to Table 9, our results suggest that the moderation effect of online social
networking is insignificant for the small fans group (e.g., coefficient of 0.026, z-value of 
1.517). In the Lgroup, the interaction effect (coefficient of 0.025, z-value of 2.787) of 
combined negative media reports and investment opportunities with online social networks is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results suggest that the existence of 
online social networking can enhance the aspect of corporate governance for these firms only
when affected by negative media reports and in the large fan groups.
[Insert Table 9 about here]




        
         
     
     





       
      
        
        
    
     
    
 
    
       
          
      
the total number of reports to obtain the reported positive tendency as a substitute for total
media reports. We also substitute the variable of online social networking with the number of
subscriptions. Both alternative variables are introduced into Model 2 for robustness testing. 
Results, presented in Table 10, are consistent with both the full sample regression and the
regressions for the SOE and non-SOEs groups. This suggests that our original test results are
robust.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
5. Discussion
5.1. Discussion of the main findings
The summary of our main findings is displayed in Table 11. Firstly, we find that 
traditional media reports significantly improve the efficiency of corporate investment (H1). 
This result is consistent with Zhang and Su (2015). The authors used China’s A-share listed 
firms from 2007 to 2011, and the empirical results supported the supposition that media
reports, acting as external supervision and informal governance mechanisms, enhance
corporate investment efficiency. Our empirical results update the results of Zhang and Su 
(2015) using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2011 to 2016.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
Secondly, our results suggest a significantly negative effect of combined positive media
reports with investment opportunities on investment efficiency (H2a). There are many
possible reasons for this result which are beyond the scope of this study. However, the most




       
       
       
   
    
      
 
       
         
    
          
     
     
     
     
  
    
     
    
         
   
         
increase investment and further overinvestment, which results in investment inefficiency.
This finding is in line with the previous study by Malmendier and Tate (2008), suggesting
that overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability to generate returns from merger and
acquisition decisions, which results in overpaying for target companies or undertaking
value-destroying mergers. Further, and in contrast to Zhang and Su (2015), our research
distinguishes positive media reports from negative ones and their different effects on
investment efficiency.
Thirdly, our study suggests that overall, online social networks affect corporates’ 
investment efficiency positively (H3) and they correct the overinvestment effect, which
combined positive media reports with investment opportunities (H4a). This is an original
finding in this study. The reason behind this result is in line with the study by Ferrara (2014),
which suggested that online social networking increases the possibility of information
aggregation and fission and thus, investors have more opportunities to obtain relevant
information to help with their rational investment decision. The effect of negative media
reports when combined with investment opportunities (H2b) or with both online social
networks and investment opportunities (H4b) is insignificant.
Finally, the effects of traditional media on investment efficiency are significant for 
SOES but not for non-SOEs, which is associated with H1 and H2a. In contrast, we found that 
the effects of online social networks on investment efficiency are significant for non-SOEs 
but not for SOEs, which is associated with H3 and H4a. The different effect of online social
networks and traditional media associated with the ownership structure of the corporates is




       
    
      
           
      
      
     
          
       
  
      
    
    
    
       
       
 
 
     
       
     
    
number of powerful and large SOEs and a large number of small and medium-sized
non-SOEs, where the SOEs have more power than their non-SOEs counterparts in leveraging 
and networking the social capital of the traditional media such as TV and magazines as these
are controlled by the government. This is in line with prior literature, suggesting that there is
discriminatory treatment between SOEs and non-SOEs in China, such as more financial 
resources, e.g., bank loans, being more available for SOEs than for non-SOEs (Liu et al.,
2018). Our finding about the effects of traditional media is different from the previous studies. 
For instance, Zhu and Tan (2014) suggest that media supervision has a negative effect on
investment efficiency in both SOEs and non-SOEs; He et al. (2008) suggest that media
supervision has a very limited effect on corporate investment in SOEs.
What is new in our study is the identification of the differing effects of online social
networks. Non-SOEs can access and use online social networks to interact with investors 
though their access to capital investment is rather scarce (Wu et al., 2013). Due to the lack of 
transparency in the firms’ information disclosure, online social networking platforms such as
Weibo play a unique role in providing opportunities for the public and active investors to 
engage in virtual communication and socialisation as a way of pursuing the ‘truth’ and
identifying suitable investment opportunities (Du and Lai, 2018).
5.2. Theoretical implications
The findings in this study provide insights into corporate governance, investment
efficiency and sustainability strategy (Klettner et al., 2014; Benlemlih and Bitar, 2018) in the
digital era, when online social networks are a key driver of corporate strategy (Crifo et al., 




   
        
    
  
     
       
     
   
     
    
        
      
          
     
     
  
   
       
   
   
      
  
information and this in turn requires corporates to embrace big data applications in corporate
governance and strategy development (Pappas et al., 2018). Our findings provide timely and
empirical support for theoretical implications relevant to the theme of this Special Issue: big 
data, analytics and its application as a driver of innovation and strategy development.
Firstly, online social networking and traditional media reports play different roles in terms
of corporate governance. The effect of traditional media on corporate governance depends on
government intervention and the voluntary behaviour of executives (Zhang and Su, 2015).
However, the mainstream financial media in China tend to report the investment behaviour of
companies in a positive way which purposefully, and either consciously or subconsciously, 
improves the reputation and personal image of senior executives (Jin and Yu, 2018). As a
result, positive media reports boost managerial overconfidence resulting in overinvestment. 
Meanwhile, some of the leading investors in the stock market often adopt the ‘foot voting’
approach to media reports though these reports may be not aligned to their individual beliefs
and investment principles. Therefore, traditional media reports fail to effectively improve
firms’ investment efficiency and are more likely lead to overinvestment and hence,
inefficiency of the investment.
On the contrary, corporate online social networks represented by Weibo in China rapidly
spread information to relevant participants and a wide audience through the use of, for
example, ‘post’, ‘forward’ and ‘re-post’ (Hales et al., 2018). Relevant investors can get 
important information from the corporate Weibo account and interact with both corporate and
other peer investors through the use of media functional tools such as ‘forward’, ‘comment’ 




   
  
    
     
   
          
       
   
   
  
      
   
     
     
  
 
      
       
      
    
   
     
responses, engage with online social media communication and respond with changes in 
capital market activity (Hales et al., 2018; Blankespoor et al., 2018).
Secondly, there are significant differences in the communication mechanisms between 
traditional media and online social networks. Traditional media often conveys relevant 
information from the corporate to the wider public through media reports. As an independent 
medium, these analytical reports about a firm are mostly based on the information disclosed 
by the firms’ management to the public and are combined with the opinions of specialist 
teams of business analysts. During busy periods, corporate information could be
over-interpreted or misinterpreted, further enhancing the problem of information asymmetry
between investors and the firms’ management. Moreover, the accessibility to and the
dissemination of traditional media information is also constrained by the nature of such
media, i.e., one-way communication. For example, as information is transmitted one-way
(media to the audience), media outlets cannot choose who to convey the information to; there
is a lack of accurate real-time feedback. Also, small and medium-size investors have poorer
access to relevant information and fewer opportunities to participate in the dissemination of 
such information. As the dissemination mechanisms/information channels that traditional 
media use attract the government’s attention, any possible public or corporate intervention
happens very slowly. As a result, the one-way communication model used by traditional 
media not only makes it difficult to form an adequate/efficient investor-centralized 
communication channel using media reports but also appears to be significantly unable to 
attract the government’s attention and intervention when it is needed. On the contrary, these




   
     
     
     
    
  
   
       
       
        
       
     
     
       
   
      
      
    
      
    
    
    
networks. Individual members of corporate social media communities not only help to
enhance information accessibility to a wider audience but also promote corporate
communication by reposting or forwarding all relevant posts on Weibo. This intense
interaction can then form threads of ‘hot’ issues, which are more likely to attract the attention 
of government departments or firms’ senior executives to enhance corporate governance and
improve efficiency in terms of corporate investment.
6. Conclusions and recommendations
This study empirically examined how the interaction of online social networks with
traditional media supervision affects corporate governance and investment efficiency in
particular. Our findings indicate that media reports fail to act as a corporate governance
mechanism with regard to investment efficiency when there are excessive investment 
opportunities available. The existence of online social networks helps firms to curb the
combined negative effect of media reports and investment opportunities on investment
efficiency, exerting a significant governance effect, particularly for non-SOEs. Apart from the
traditional function of information dissemination, online social networking socialises wider 
corporate stakeholders and effectively compensates for the dysfunction of media reports as a
corporate governance mechanism. This is an original contribution from this study, which adds
to the knowledge of corporates’ external governance mechanism. Previous literature has 
discussed the effect of traditional media reports on investment efficiency (Chen et al., 2011a;
Cheng et al., 2013; Dutta and Nezlobin, 2017; Munzel et al., 2018) or the effect of online
social networks on individual behavior or stock prices (Lee et al., 2015; Rosati et al., 2018).




        
         
        
 
      
         
       
        
     
        
  
       
        
   
     
 
       
          
      
    
      
    
reports has rarely been investigated. Hence, our study fills in this gap and updates to
knowledge of corporate governance in a new context where advanced technologies such as 
online social media are considered for their potential to enhance corporate governance and
strategy development (Blazquez and Domenech, 2018).
Through the comparative analysis of the large fans group versus the small fans group,
we found that social media networking can significantly reduce the negative effect of
negative media reports on corporate investment in the large fans group but insignificantly in
the small group. This is a novel finding though it needs more investigation in the future. This 
finding provides practical implications to enhance corporate governance on how to best
utilize online social media to enhance corporate governance and improve investment
efficiency.
Based on the current study with its limitations, we look forward to future research
developments. There is a variation of investment efficiency across industries or sections in
different countries. For instance, the investment efficency in the United Kingdom’s National
Health Service (NHS) has been criticised (e.g., Chang et al., 2011) while it is less exposed to 
the public attention outside of the NHS on social media platforms due to Data Protection Acts. 
This research focuses on Chinese listed firms. Hence, in the future, there is potential to
investigate differences between China and the UK in a specific sector or industry such as 
healthcare. Also, in China, investment efficency may be affected by local government
policies and their involvement in corporates’ media supervision and online social networks
(Veronica et al., 2019), and therefore, regional or provicial differences in investment
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Appendix A. Category of media reports and list of key terms used for the categorization
Category Key term
acquisition; merger; stock subscription; stock and share; construction; transnational investment;
project; project investment; investment scale; investment earnings; investment contracts;




investment; investment in research and development; project investment; equity investment;
investment in intangible assets; merger of companies; asset restructuring; asset placement;
overinvestment; underinvestment; investment bubbles; partnership investment; investment 
financing; investment failure; investment analysis; investor research; investment coordination
committee; fund research; infrastructure investment; foreign investment; diversified investment;
cultural investment; investment in tourism projects; establishment of branch companies; new 
project; investment loans; investment bonus
investment; model; bull; investment income exceeds expectations; investment gains; private
capital raising; investment return; net profit exceeds expectations; earnings per share; positive and
profitable; multiple benefits; bonus and dividend; positive evaluation; smooth progress, promote 
the implementation of the project; increase the quota of the entrusted financial credit; completion
of investment; go up; counterattack; profits on the books; surprisingly selected; year-on-year
growth; good performance; unanimously approved by the board of directors; rise by a big margin; 
Positive 
reports
a sharp increase; steady improvement; place high hopes; speed up; shareholding reform;
hopefully; fund issuance; breakthrough; the top leader of earnings; promotion; new inventions
gain worldwide attention; soar; proposed investment; widely admired and followed; new
development opportunities; sign; sail with the wind; foreign investment; the first limit-up after
falling; sign an agreement on capital increase and investment; cooperate; joint capital increase;
joint investment; successful acquisition; recovery; favorite; reshuffle; ignite the market; increase
the investment; Gold will shine; good return on investment; bull; advance on; new peak; push
hard into; successful backdoor listing; opportunities; value-added; investment opportunities;
limit-up
quoting a price; cut; compress; illegal; violations; investment failure; potential risks; earnings are
hard to estimate; shadow; net profit fall; earnings decline; exchange losses; resignation; rumor; 
drop out; suspension for investigation; adverse to long-term development; suspend; net loss;
Negative crisis; conceal poor performance; claims; terminate the cooperation with the government; fall;
reports depression; reduce; break the law; being punished; problems; losses; narrow escape; being caught
in trouble; slide; attempted listing; being shuffled; overall renewal; go down; narrow down; short
of money; uncertain prospects; ‘miscarriage’; Being denied; overinvestment; debt crisis; financial 








































               
       
       
        
Appendix B. Descriptive statistics of fan groups in the corporate Sina accounts
Fan group N Mean of fans SD Median of fans Min of fans Max of fans
Full sample 510 790408.153 3524915.265 9141 9 23294204
Small group 258 1560283.233 4837780.688 290000 9141 23294204












































Note: Hypotheses with letters ‘a’ and ‘b’ indicate the interaction effect of positive or negative




   




        
         






         
        
   
  
 
       
  
 
       
  
 
       
 
       
   
     
 
 
      
    
     
  
 
       
   
   















Table 1. Definitions of relevant variables
Type Variables Symbol Definitions of variables
d














ar expenditure assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets) / total 
assets
Online social 
The number of followings plus the number of Weibo fans plus
network





(Corporate official Sina account: Yes, Sn=1; No, Sn=0)
v














Pmedia Natural logarithm of the number of positive reports +1
The number of
negative reports
Nmedia Natural logarithm of the number of negative reports +1
Cash flow Cfo Firm’s net operating cash flows
Leverage Lev Net assets/total assets












Tq tradable shares plus the book value of non-tradable shares and






Seo Capital raised via seasoned equity offerings / Total assets







       
       
       
       
   
 
   
   
 
   
      
       
   
 
  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max
Inv 2808 0.052 0.031 0.051 -0.472 0.373
Sn 2808 0.335 0 0.253 0 1







Notes: Inv stands for firms’ investment expenditure; Sn stands for the online social network; Tmedia
stands for the total number of media reports; Pmedia stands for the number of positive media reports; 




      
        
 
       
        
 
       
        
 
       
        
 
       
        
 
       
        
 
       
        
          
           
           



















Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the paired and media samples



























































































Notes: Inv stands for firms’ investment expenditure; Sn stands for online social network; Size is a proxy for the 
firm’s total assets; Tq is a proxy for the firms’ investment opportunities; Cfo stands for the firm’s net operating
cash flows; Seo captures any additional equity capital raised by the firm; and, Lev is a proxy for firm’s leverage 




     
       
       


























Table 4. Mean difference analysis of the paired and media samples
Variable obs Mean obs(paired) Mean(paired) Mean-diff t
Inv 1404 0.046 1404 0.046 -0.000 -0.035






      
























   
 
 













































    
    
    
              
         
          
            
            
             
             




Table 5. Regression results of media supervision and investment efficiency










































Industry Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2808 2808 2808
Notes: Columns 1, 2, and 3 present the regression results of the effects of a total number of media reports,
positive and negative media reports on investment efficiency. Tq is a proxy for the firms’ investment 
opportunities; Tmedia stands for the total number of reports; Pmedia stands for the number of positive reports; 
Nmedia stands for the number of negative reports; Cfo stands for the firm’s net operating cash flows; Lev is a 
proxy for firm’s leverage estimated as the proportion of firm’s net assets to its total assets; Seo captures any
additional equity capital raised by the firm; Size is a proxy for the firm’s total assets; List is the number of listed
years for the firm acting as a proxy for stock market maturity, Industry and Year report controlling for relevant 





    
 
      
   

























    
 




































       
       
           
            
         









Table 6. Comparative analysis of the media supervision effect in SOEs and non-SOEs
Inv. Efficiency Inv. Efficiency Inv. Efficiency
Variables (1) (2) (3)
SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE
0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007***













0.091 -0.133 0.092 -0.136 0.091 -0.136
(1.434) (-1.436) (1.456) (-1.464) (1.429) (-1.470)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes











Notes: Tq is a proxy for the firms’ investment opportunities; Tmedia stands for the total number of reports; 
Pmedia stands for the number of positive reports; Nmedia stands for the number of negative reports; SOE





      
 







































   
 
 
   
 
 













































    
    
    
          
             
          
               
            
   
Table 7. Combined effect of online social networking and media reports on investment 
efficiency




















































Industry Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2808 2808 2808
Notes: Tq is a proxy for the firms’ investment opportunities; Sn stands for online social network; Tmedia, 
Pmedia and Nmedia stands for the numbers of total, positive and negative reports respectively; Cfo stands for
the firm’s net operating cash flows; Lev is a proxy for firm’s leverage; Seo captures any additional equity capital 
raised by the firm; Size is a proxy for the firm’s total assets; List is the number of listed years for the firm,
Industry and Year report controlling for relevant fixed effects. Z-values are in brackets; *** and ** indicate




      
 
 
   
   












































    
 




































       
       
            
            
            
   
 
  
Table 8. Comparative analysis of the online social networking effect upon SOEs and 
non-SOEs’ investment efficiency
Inv. Efficiency Inv. Efficiency Inv. Efficiency
Variables (1) (2) (3)
SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE
0.010*** 0.008*** 0.0098*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007***
(3.930) (3.287) (3.828) (3.063) (3.554) (2.979)
0.001 -0.034*** -0.001 -0.031*** 0.003 -0.031***



















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes














Notes: Tq is a proxy for the firms’ investment opportunities; Sn stands for online social network; Tmedia stands
for the total number of reports; Pmedia stands for the number of positive reports; Nmedia stands for the number
of negative reports; SOE stands for state-owned enterprise; Z-values are in brackets; *** and ** indicate




     
 
      
   











































     
 



































       
       
            
            







Table 9. Comparative analysis of the interaction effect in Sgroup versus Lgroup 
Inv. Efficiency Inv. Efficiency Inv. Efficiency
Variables (1) (2) (3)































































Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 258 252 258 252 258 252
Notes: Tq is a proxy for the firms’ investment opportunities; Sn stands for online social network; Tmedia stands
for the total number of reports; Pmedia stands for the number of positive reports; Nmedia stands for the number

































































       
       
           
           





















Table 10. Robustness test




























































Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2808 1662 1146 2808 1662 1146
Notes: Tq is a proxy for the firms’ investment opportunities; Sn stands for online social network; Mediatrend
stands for the proportion of positive reports to the total number of media reports; Z-values are in brackets; ***







    
    
     
     
     
      






Table 11. Summary of the test results.
Group comparison
Hypothesis Support For SOEs For Non-SOEs
H1:Tmedia-> +Inv YES YES NO
H2a: Pmedia*Tq -> -Inv YES YES NO
H2b: Nmedia*Tq -> +Inv NO NO NO
H3: Sn -> Inv YES NO YES
H4a: Sn* Pmedia*Tq -> +Inv YES NO YES
H4b: Sn* Nmedia*Tq -> +Inv NO NO NO
47
